the spectrum from suggestive to important to influential to decisive. More to the point, moralists such as Ronald Dworkin, John Finnis, Alan Gewirth, Thomas Nagel, Charles Fried, Martha Nussbaum, John Rawls, Joseph Raz, Thomas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson, have directly criticized Judge Posner for allowing the dismal science of economics to trump moral sensibility. In his lectures and book he counterattacks on the broad ground that the academic moralists have not shown that morality has any useful content. In a more recent writing, he adds that his disbelief in universal moral law cannot be proved to be incorrect by anyone who reasons about moral questions from a perspective other than his own. 4 Perhaps his signal claim is that "there are no convincing answers to contested moral questions unless the questions are reducible to ones of fact."
5
Judge Posner begins his Problematics by disavowing moral relativism. He says "I
am not a moral relativist in the 'anything goes' sense more accurately described as moral subjectivism or moral skepticism." 6 It is difficult to pin down what he means by this assertion. Consider his statement that "the criteria for pronouncing a moral claim valid are given by the culture in which the claim is advanced rather than by some transcultural ('universal') source of moral values." 7 At a minimum he is saying that morality varies according to the culture in which it is expressed. This means that for Judge Posner an act that is moral in one locality can be immoral in another. Yet what is a morality whose content changes from place to place other than relative morality? Judge Posner is apparently aiming for cultural moral relativism as opposed to individual moral relativism, 4 Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Liberalism versus Classical Liberalism, 71 U. Chicago Law Rev. 659, 668 (2004) . 5 Id. at 10. 6 Problematics 8. 7 Ibid. It is unclear whether Judge Posner's position is empirically dependent upon there being more than one culture in the world.
in which individuals are morally constrained by the moral precepts of their culture. While the content of the moral precepts may vary from culture to culture, Judge Posner regards this as an extrinsic fact that does not bear upon an individual's morality. For every individual is bound by, and cannot justifiably deviate from, the morality of the culture in which he happens to be located.
If Judge Posner's view of morality is not totally relative, it has a strong jurisdictional flavor. By analogy, a German citizen in Germany is not subject to the laws of France, and a French citizen in France is not subject to German law. French law is certainly extrinsic to a non-traveling German citizen. Law may vary in content from a macro point of view, but the individual citizen is faced with a fixed set of rules in his or her home territory. Judge Posner's views on morality are explicable if one substitutes "law" for "morality."
Is morality jurisdictional? Or is Judge Posner's position more nuanced than that?
To Judge Posner's credit the five examples he has chosen to apply his views on morality are not at all easy to analyze. Their mutual differences give us distinct windows to view the particulars of his moral theory.
I. Infanticide
"Infanticide," Judge Posner writes, "is abhorred in our society but routine in ones that cannot feed all the children that are born." 8 His empirical observation taken alone might be correct, but the clear implication of the "but" in the middle of his sentence is the 8 Id. at 19.
claim that infanticide is abhorred in our society but not abhorred in societies that are at the starvation level. Yet how would he know that those societies (in which infanticide is routine) do not abhor the practice? A mother in a starving society may be grief-stricken that her newborn child must be killed. Why would it be inconsistent for her to abhor both the fact that the rulers of her society are living in extravagant luxury and the fact that she must kill her own child because she has no access to food? She and her friends might conceivably use Judge Posner's word routine, if they use it at all, to assuage their feelings of guilt-to reassure themselves that everybody has to do it. Or maybe they call it routine ironically. There is no inherent contradiction between routine and abhorrent. Is Judge
Posner perhaps intimating that when people are starving they become morally indifferent to infanticide? At bottom he wants to show that morality changes its content in starving versus non-starving societies, thus proving his main point that moral standards are factdependent. But since the ordinary use of the term 'moral' is the characterizaation of a set of facts, it is hardly persuasive to turn the sentence around and say that facts themselves show the vacuity of the concept of morality.
Judge Posner seeks morality in the normal or routine behavior of societies, but not all abnormal behavior is immoral:
A person who murders an infant is acting immorally in our society; a person who sincerely claimed, with or without supporting evidence, that it is right to kill infants would be asserting a private moral position. 
II. Slavery
Judge Posner argues that if there is at least one justification for slavery, then we cannot say that it is always wrong. He asserts:
Slavery was routine when the victors in war could not afford to feed or free their captives, so that the alternative to enslaving them was killing them.
15
This argument, which originated in Aristotle and was championed by John Locke, needs to be trimmed down by moral considerations to make it a more debatable case for either its apologists or its opponents. Surely the argument cannot apply to victors in any war but only to victors in certain kinds of war. A victor on the side of the aggressor is morally bankrupt to begin with, and thus there is no morality in reserve, so to speak, to cover his enslavement of his captives. This is not true of course of the the opposing side which, suttee, many related and neighboring thoughts also must be modified or deleted. A mind that is intolerant of suttee has a vast set of interconnected beliefs relating to the equality of men and women, animal rights, and so on. These beliefs must be modified, changed, or deleted in order to make space for a tolerance of suttee. Otherwise the new tolerance would be hemmed in by contradictory thoughts relating to human rights and equality in general. It would leave the mind with massive cognitive dissonance. The mind itself would try to remove the dissonance by attacking and modifying the tolerance-for-suttee idea. In brief, it would be impossible or nearly impossible to change the time-traveler's attitude toward suttee and without disturbing or changing all the other thoughts and memories that constitute his mind. The only way to change the time-traveler's mind so as to accommodate the concept of suttee is to change it wholesale-that is, to change it into a typical mind of a nineteenth-century British colonial officer. But if we do that, it would not be Judge Posner who is being sent back to the nineteenth century, but rather someone else whose mind is quite different. It would be a mind that is congruent with the mind of a nineteenth-century British colonial officer. Personal identity is, after all, determined by the mind and not by the body.
21
The foregoing argument proves:
(1) If Judge Posner travels back in time with his present values, he will simply apply those values to the target culture. This procedure will not yield any no new information (that is, nothing can be learned from it).
(2) If Judge Posner travels back in time with values that can be filled in by the target culture, it will not be Judge Posner that emerges from the time machine but rather a body that resembles Judge Posner's. This procedure cannot yield new information.
In conclusion, Judge Posner's suttee example does not help qualify his argument. 22 We turn to the morality of female genital mutilation.
IV. Female Genital Mutilation
The form of female circumcision that is called outside of Africa "female genital mutilation" consists of a removal by knife of the clitoris, the cutting of the labia majora and then the sewing together of the labia majora to cover the vagina, leaving a small opening to allow urine and menstrual blood to pass through. (On the night of her marriage, her husband cuts the threads open.) According to Amnesty International, over two million female circumcisions are performed each year, nearly all in a wide territorial and not the donee. 22 There is a way to support the practice of suttee on its merits although Judge Posner does not mention it. The practice of suttee must have strongly enhanced the bonds of husband and wife in nineteenth century India. If a man marries a woman knowing that she will throw herself on his funeral bier if his death precedes hers, perhaps he will respect and appreciate her more during his lifetime for giving him a future gift of such an immense sacrifice. Moreover, he may be less apprehensive about dying if he knows that his wife will make the journey to the afterlife next to him. This gives him another reason to be grateful to his wife. Of course, this argument is not convincing. But it serves a function similar to Locke's argument about slavery, supra.
band that stretches from Senegal in West Africa to Somalia on the east coast, primarily in
Muslim ar
eas. The term given to them is infibulation. Judge Posner explains the purpose of the procedure in his book Sex and Reason (1992) :
By reducing the woman's capacity to experience sexual pleasure, the removal of the clitoris reduces the risk of a wife's committing adultery.
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Judge Posner goes on to justify the practice in economic terms: it is cheaper for the husband to marry a woman who has been the victim of genital mutilation than to hire detectives to watch over her during the day, when the husband is at work, to make sure that she does not commit adultery. Thus the practice of female circumcision is based on cost-effectiveness.
Where is Judge Posner's 'disgust' now that he seems to need it? It has apparently been trumped by family values:
[Defenders of female genital mutilation] claim that it is indispensable to maintaining the family in the circumstances in which the practice is followed. The claim is arguable. If it is correct, the moral critic is disarmed: for there is no lever for exalting individual choice or sexual pleasure over family values.
24
Although we saw in the previous discussion of suttee that Judge Posner was willing to ignore family values, here they loom large. The high economic cost of surveillance of the wife during the day seems to tip the scale in favor of infibulation.. In contrast with the suttee case, where the cost of adding the widow to the top of the burning bier is trivial, 23 Richard A. Judge Posner, Sex and Reason 257 (1992) . 24 Problematics 22.
here the significant cost of surveillance must weigh heavily in Judge Posner's moral reasoning..
Judge Posner is always keen to find an economic rationale for a social practice that otherwise seems inexplicable. However, there is a downside associated with looking for economic explanations-the temptation to abandon the analysis as soon as the economic rationale is reached. Suppose we pursue the question of female genital mutilation beyond the limits that satisfy Judge Posner. We might ask why it is that many countries along the previously described wide territorial band in Africa have made female infibulation illegal. The legislators in these countries are almost exclusively male. If female infibulation benefits men as Judge Posner suggests it does (by reducing their surveillance costs), then why do these male legislative bodies enact laws, and retain them on the books, that criminalize the practice? Perhaps the men in those societies believe that a nonmonetary cost exceeds the economic benefit. \ Let us accordingly consider the women who forcibly tie young girls to a tree and cut their labia. All those women were themselves infibulated when they were young.
Perhaps they are now acting out of jealousy. They may not want sexual competition from the girls. Or they might not want to be confronted with the idea that a girl might derive pleasure from the act of sexual intercourse. Additionally there is the elemental motivation: "If it was good enough for me when I was your age, then it is good enough for you." (With appropriate modifications, these arguments may explain the duration of other traditions in our society.)
There is another difference between infibulation and Judge Posner's previous example of suttee. The bereaved widow voluntarily threw herself upon the funeral bier, but young girls dread infibulation and resist it with all their might. The young girl is a dissident within the culture. The older women will pounce on her at night when she is asleep, take her to a tree and spread-eagle her body against it, and then without giving her any anesthetic proceed to cut her clitoris. They stuff a rag in her mouth to prevent screaming. Do these women and their beliefs constitute the 'locality' that is the source, for Judge Posner, of moral norms? Why isn't the victim of the genital mutilation also a locality-a locality of one? Why shouldn't her own moral norms block the moral norms of the women around her? Judge Posner earlier anticipated such an argument:
There is no inconsistency in saying that all moral truths are local but adding that one's own morality is hyperlocal, being limited to oneself.
25
When we come to the topic of genital mutilation, should the principle of hyperlocality operate to protect the twelve-year-old girl facing infibulation? Judge Posner responds:
It is vacuous to complain that the mutilated girls are often too young to be able to make a responsible choice (assuming that they are even given a choice) of whether to undergo the procedure. The moral code of these societies is not founded on principles of freedom, autonomy, or equality, and there is no privileged standpoint from which to argue that it should be.
26
If there is no 'privileged standpoint,' then by what mechanism does Judge Posner privilege the moral code of the culture over the moral code of the twelve-year-old girl? It is not because the mutilators are older because Judge Posner's first sentence rules out the age factor.
25 Id. at 9. 26 Id. at 22.
Let us compare and contrast the earlier example of slavery. Would Judge Posner say that it is arbitrary to listen to a slave's claim that slavery is immoral because the slave has neither freedom nor autonomy to make such a claim? Is Judge Posner assigning more power to dictatorial societies if they want to override individual moralities? Is he saying that hyperlocality depends on a moral code that includes freedom and equality? Is he saying that freedom and equality vary from culture to culture so that it is possible for one culture-call it the Orwellian culture-to say that slavery is freedom? Perhaps Judge
Posner is just asserting a point of personal privilege: that hyperlocality applies only to himself. It is hard to see how Judge Posner's inquiry into the morality of female genital mutilation has advanced his attempt to work out a space for himself between absolute and relative morality.
V. The Holocaust
Judge Posner has demonstrated through his writings a remarkable willingness to address any issue of public concern and importance no matter how politically sensitive that issue might be. Of the Holocaust he writes:
That the Nazis killed millions of defenseless civilians is a fact; its truth is independent of what anyone believes. That the Nazis' actions were morally wrong is a value judgment: it depends on beliefs that cannot be proved true or false. Judge Posner is building upon Hume's famous argument that authors on morality often move imperceptibly from is-statements to ought-statements. 28 If writers wish to derive an ought from an is, Hume added, they should give an explanation of how this is done. Without screaming or weeping, these people undressed, stood around in family groups, kissed each other, said farewells, and waited for a sign from another SS man, who stood near the pit with a whip in his hand. During the fifteen minutes I stood nearby, I heard no plea for mercy. I watched a family of about eight people, a man and a woman of about fifty with two daughters of about twenty to twenty-four and boys of about one, eight, and ten. An old woman with snow-white hair was holding the one-year-old in her arms and singing to it and tickling it. The child was cooing with delight. The couple were looking on with tears in their eyes. The father was holding the hand of a boy about ten years old and speaking to him softly; the boy was fighting his tears. The father pointed to the sky, stroked his head and seemed to explain something to him. At that moment the SS man at the pit shouted something to his comrade who then counted off about twenty persons and instructed them to get down behind a mound of earth. Among them was the family I have mentioned.
An SS man sat on the edge of the narrow end of the pit, his feet dangling a Tommy gun on his knees. He was smoking a cigarette. The people, completely naked, went down some steps which were cut in the clay wall of the pit and clambered over the heads of the dead lying there, to the place to which the SS man directed them. They lay down in front of the dead or injured; some caressed those who were still alive and spoke to them about Hitler? Except for special situations (conducting a census, for example), Hitler's biographical data are uninteresting per se. It is the moral fact about Hitler (that he is evil) that can make his biographical data interesting at least to those familiar with the context of that data. 31 See, e.g., Ruth Anna Putnam, Creating Facts and Values, 60 Philosophy 187 (1985) ; Ruth Anna Putnam, Perceiving Facts and Values, 73 Philosophy 5 (1998) . in a low voice. Then I heard a series of shots. I looked into the pit and saw that the bodies were twitching or lying motionless on top of those before them. Blood was running from their necks.
32
The German eyewitness was describing a value-laden activity. The word "immoral" would describe (with less specificity) the same event. We are hard-wired to view the Perhaps Judge Posner's long judicial experience has taught him how to short-circuit that hard wiring.
VI. Conclusion
Judge Posner has tried to carve out a space for his own version of morality that lies somewhere in between universal and relative morality. He does not want to be a thoroughgoing relativist because that position reduces to a separate morality for every person. Hence he settles on culturally relativistic morality: each culture has a distinct morality that is binding only on the people living within it.
Although Judge Posner's position is forceful, intricate, and nuanced, this Article has attempted to show in detailed analysis that it is ultimately incoherent. If he had concluded simply that moral considerations have no place in his courtroom, then at least attorneys could know which kinds of arguments to avoid when appearing before him.
Instead, it is ironic that for all he has disclosed about his approach to moral questions, the 32 Quoted in Sereny, n. 22 supra, at 24-25. litigating attorney is left with no guidance. An attorney can read all his books and articles and still not have any idea of how to argue cases before him that involve questions of morality or fairness. (Perhaps this is what Judge Posner intends.)
